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D URING the past year there were a number of cases of interest dealing with
various aspects of the hearsay rule.
In Sherrill v. Estate of 'Plumley' the court of civil appeals considered five
questions concerning the admissibility of hearsay evidence in a proceeding
to determine the heirs of Mrs. Alpha Genevieve Meyer who died intestate
in 1962 leaving no children or spouse. Her parents were divorced in 1900
and Mrs. Meyer and her father were never in contact again. Her mother,
Mrs. Jennie C. Pettis, died in 1950. Thus, under the intestacy statute2 Mrs.
Meyer's estate should pass to her maternal grandparents or their descendants.
The parties each claimed that their respective predecessors were the true
grandparents of Mrs. Meyer. The appellants claimed under Robert and
Mary Plumley, and the appellees claimed under Richard and Alice Plumley.
The first issue before the court concerned the admissibility of a 1915 news-
paper obituary of Robert Plumley. The notice recited that Robert Plumley
was survived by three named children, but 'Mrs. Pettis was not listed among
the survivors. The item was offered by the appellees to show that Mrs. Pettis
was not the daughter of Robert Plumley as claimed by the appellants.8
The court quickly dismissed the suggestion that the obituary was admissible
under the Business Records Act.4  Since the notice was unsigned and the
author was unknown, the appellees could not show that the author had
personal knowledge of the facts stated in the notice. Similarly, whether any-
one with the newspaper would have had personal knowledge of facts
contained in the obituary columns in the ordinary course of business was not
established. Therefore, neither of the requirements of section 1(b) of the
statute were met. 5
* B.A., LL.B., University of Texas. Fulbright & Jaworski Professor of Law, Uni-
versity of Texas at Austin. The author gratefully acknowledges the invaluable assistance
of Mr. Douglas S. Johnston of the University of Texas at Austin School of Law in the
preparation of this Article.
1. 514 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e).
2. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 34(a)4 (1956).
3. No consideration was given to the question of whether the out-of-court state-
ments offered to show a negative implication are properly classified as hearsay. See Ad-
visory Committee's Note to FED. R. Evm. 803(7), 56 F.R.D. 183, 311 (1973).
4. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 3737e (1974).
5. Article 3737e:
Section 1. A memorandum or record of an act, event or condition shall,
in so far as relevant, be competent evidence of the occurrence of the act or
event or the existence of the condition if the judge finds that:
... (b) It was the regular course of that business for an employee or
representative of that business with personal knowledge of such act, event
or condition to make such memorandum or record or to transmit informa-
tion thereof to be included in such memorandum or record ....
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The second theory proposed as a basis for admission of the obituary was
that it qualified under the ancient documents exception to the hearsay rule.
Under this exception it must be established: (1) that the document is more
than thirty years old; 6 (2) that it is free from suspicious appearances; 7 and
(3) that the document came from a place of proper custody.8 Additionally,
both McCormick and Ray9 and McCormick' ° indicate that the author of the
document must have had personal knowledge of the facts stated. Again, the
identity of the author proved to be a stumbling block.
With respect to the ancient documents exception the court briefly con-
sidered the earlier Fifth Circuit decision in Dallas County v. 'Commercial
Union Assurance Co." in which a 59-year-old newspaper article describing
a fire that occurred during construction of a county courthouse was admitted
into evidence. The court of civil appeals determined that Dallas County was
inapposite because in that case the newspaper article "was admitted because
the reporter had actual knowledge of the fire and . . . it was a matter of
local concern. It's age gave it 'trustworthiness.11 2  An examination of the
opinion in Dallas County does not reveal that the reporter had personal
knowledge of the fire. The article was unsigned and the fire occurred at
two in the morning.13 Perhaps the fact that the fire was a matter of great
local concern is a sufficient basis for the different result, but it is certainly
a much closer question once the similarities in the two cases are realized.
Although the court in Sherrill held that admission of the obituary was error,
it concluded that the error was not reversible because of the trial court's
cautionary instruction.' 4
The court also rejected application of the so-called "pedigree exception"
to the hearsay rule for the same reasons that the business records and ancient
documents exceptions failed. The pedigree exception is predicated on the
notion that intra-family discussions of matters of family history are likely to
be free from purposeful deception and are reliable sources of information
regarding subjects such as the age or ancestry of family members. 5  The
appellees established -three frequently mentioned requirements for admission:
(1) the obituary was written before the controversy arose; 16 (2) no motive
6. See C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 323 (2d ed. 1972)
. [hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK]; C. MCCORMICK & R. RAY, TEXAS LAW OF EVIDENCE
§ 1376 (1956) [hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK & RAY].
7. MCCORMICK § 323.
8. Id.
9. MCCORMICK & RAY § 1376, at 207.
10. MCCORMICK § 323, at 747 n.39 and accompanying text.
11. 286 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1961).
12. 514 S.W.2d at 291.
13. 286 F.2d at 390.
14. "'... I think in overruling the objection and admitting the paper it is only
proper to let the jury know when they received this item nobody is necessarily vouching
this information in the column is absolutely accurate. We can all take notice that news-
papers could make a mistake like anyone else could. The information could or could
not be accurate .... ' " 514 S.W.2d at 291-92.
15. 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1481 (3d ed. 1940).
16. MCCORMICK & RAY § 1345. The federal rule does not retain this requirement.




for misrepresentation by the author appears; 17 and (3) the author was un-
available."' But since the author was unknown, the appellees were unable
to establish the most basic element of the exception, a showing that the author
was a family member.' 9
The second questioned item of evidence was an "heirship deed" which con-
tained the following recitals:20 "Know all men by these presents: That we,
W.H. Plumley, Jennie C. Pettis, A.M. Plumley, and Lizzie Plumley, being
all the heirs of Richard Plumley, deceased. . . ." The court held that the
deed was admissible under the "pedigree exception" because the grantors, un-
like the author of the obituary, were identified and were shown to be mem-
bers of the family. The court did experience some difficulty in disposing of
the appellants' contention that the recitals were "conclusions of law, not state-
ments of fact."' 21 This objection was no more than a disguised attack on the
weight to be given the recitals in the deed. The important consideration
under the "pedigree exception" is whether the declarant had knowledge,
acquired through intra-family discussions, of the matters of family history
contained in a declaration. Whether the declaration is of a conclusory nature
or not does not affect the basis of the admission of the declaration but only
inhibits its usefulness before the jury.22
The third and fourth items of evidence considered by the court were the
original and amended petitions in the divorce proceedings of Jennie and Sam
Pettis in 1900. These documents were offered for the limited purpose of
showing that the Pettises' daughter, Alpha Genevieve, was eighteen years old
in 1900. The appellants claimed the petitions lacked authentication and
were hearsay. The thrust of the authentication arguments appears to have
been that pleadings should be excluded from the rule permitting ancient doc-
uments to be authenticated by showing that they are more than thirty years
old, free from suspicious circumstances, and have been kept in a place where
old documents are normally found.23  There is no conceivable basis for ex-
cluding pleadings from the operation of this rule, and the court properly dis-
missed the contention with a minimum of discussion.
The original divorce petition was signed by Mrs. Pettis and the court had
no hesitation in holding it admissible under the "pedigree exception." The
amended petition, however, was signed by an attorney. The court properly
decided that the "pedigree exception" was inapplicable because there was not
a showing that the attorney was a family member. There was an intimation
that the ancient documents exception to the hearsay rule might provide a
basis for admission of the amended petition.2 4 Yet, there was no showing
17. MCCORMICK & RAY § 1344.
18. Id. § 1342.
19. See id. § 1343, and FED. R. Evm. 804(b)(5), suggesting that the exception be
extended to include some other close relations.
20. 514 S.W.2d at 292.
21. Id.
22. The restriction finds no support in the treatises, or in the Federal Rules. See
FED. R. EvlD. 804(b) (5); MCCORMICK & RAY § 1347; MCCORMICK § 322.
23. See MCCORMICK § 223 for discussion and McCoRMIcK & RAY § 1372, at 201,
for a broad list of documents authenticated under this rule in Texas.
24. 514 S.W.2d at 293.
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that the attorney had personal knowledge of the facts stated in the document.
Additionally, since the amended petition added little to what had already
been stated in the original petition, no special need was shown to support
admission of the amended petition. 25 The court held that it was harmless
error to admit the amended petition because the issue for which it was offered
was very limited and because the relevant part of the document was no dif-
ferent from the original petition. 26
The fifth hearsay problem arose from the exclusion from evidence of a
handwritten statement which was delivered by Mrs. Meyer to a funeral
director at the time of Mrs. 'Pettis' death in 1950. The statement, which was
delivered for the purpose of preparing an obituary notice, contained a state-
ment that Mrs. Pettis had been the daughter of 'Robert Plumley. The court's
discussion of the issue is unclear and confusing. While the trial court sus-
tained the appellees' objection, the court of civil appeals, in holding that the
exclusion was harmless error, also analyzed the issue as if the hearsay
problem predominated. But, the only significant question was whether the
document had been properly authenticated.
If it is assumed that the document had been authenticated, the "pedigree
exception" would meet the hearsay objection. 27  The preliminary inquiry,
however, must be whether the statement was actually written by Mrs. Meyer.
The appellant introduced a bank signature card signed by Mrs. Meyer in
order to show that it was her handwriting on the questioned document. Since
no question of the authenticity of the signature card was raised, sufficient
evidence was produced to warrant admission of the statement to the jury for
comparison of the two handwriting samples.2 8  Although it was error to
exclude the statement, the court held that the error was not harmful because
the substance of the statement could as easily be read to support the appel-
lees' position rather than the appellants'. 2
9
Finally, the court considered a question of the admissibility of home movies
depicting Mrs. Pettis and Mrs. Meyer in the company of the descendants of
Richard Plumley "in a family setting." °30 No question of authentication was
raised. The appellants complained that the movies were not relevant and
were prejudicial. Although it must be conceded that the evidence is not
strongly probative of the issue of whether Mrs. Pettis was Richard Plumley's
child, its relevance is still readily apparent and accordingly it was admitted.
In two cases courts of civil appeals considered the admissibility of inter-
office memoranda under the Business Records Act. 3 ' The defendant in
Bardwell v. Central Mutual Insurance Co. 3 2 disputed whether the plaintiff
had sustained an injury while on the job. In support of its position the de-
fendant offered a memorandum prepared by the president of the employer.
25. See MCCORMICK & RAY § 1376.
26. 514 S.W.2d at 293.
27. See notes 15-19 supra and accompanying text.
28. TEx. REV. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 3737b (1974).
29. 514 S.W.2d at 294-95.
30. Id. at 293.
31. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 3737e (Supp. 1975).
32. 505 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. Civ App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
[Vol. 29
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The writing was addressed "TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN" and ap-
peared to have been made some time after the plaintiff had sustained her
injury. It contained a description of the plaintiff's activities on the day in
question, including statements that the plaintiff had been discharged after less
than one day on the job and that when the plaintiff left the employer's prem-
ises she was jovial and had made no complaint of injury. The court held
that admission of the memorandum was reversible error. No showing had
been made that the author of the document had personal knowledge of the
facts contained in the memorandum. Similarly, the defendant did not show
that some employee with knowledge of the facts would convey that knowledge
to the author in the regular course of business. Thus, the requirements of
section 1(b) of the Act were not met. An even more basic reason for exclu-
sion of the memorandum was the failure of the defendant to show that the
document was produced in the ordinary course of business as required by
section l(a) of the Act. The author testified that such memoranda were
always prepared when a suit was threatened, but he could recall only one
prior occasion in the fifteen-year history of the company when a similar
memorandum had been produced. Upon a similar rationale, first established
in the classic case of Palmer v. Hoffman,33 the court could have denied the
admissibility of the memorandum because it was prepared with a view to liti-
gation and thereby suffered the dual maladies of being prepared outside the
ordinary course of business and for a self-serving purpose.
In Moore v. Richardson Savings & Loan Ass'n 34 the defendant in a usury
action contended that the usurious terms of the contract were inserted
because of a mistake. In support of this defense the defendant offered a
memorandum written by the loan officer assigned to investigate the matter
after the plaintiff had complained to the defendant. The memorandum
included the observation that "the contracts as set up are in error."'35 The
plaintiff did not question the authenticity of the document nor was there any
dispute that the writing had been made in the regular course of the defend-
ant's business. Rather, the plaintiff complained that the loan officer could
not have had personal knowledge of the facts stated in the memorandum,
since he had not been employed by the defendant at the time the contracts
were executed.
The 'Dallas court of civil appeals held that the memorandum was properly
admitted. The court reasoned that the loan officer was a qualified expert
in the field of loan contracts and, therefore, the ordinary rule that the declar-
ant must have had personal knowledge did not preclude the expert from giv-
ing his opinion regarding the contracts. The Texas Supreme Court in Loper
v. Andrews36 expressly authorized the admissibility of expert opinions in
business records. Since the opposing party might not have an opportunity
to cross-examine an expert as to an opinion contained in a business record,
the court in Loper established the requirement that the opinion must be one
33. 318 U.S. 109 (1943).
34. 499 S.W.2d 364 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973, no writ).
35. Id. at 367.
36. 404 S.W.2d 300 (Tex. 1966).
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that would be generally accepted in the relevant field of expertise. 37 This
prophylactic was not necessary in Moore because the loan officer was present
at the trial and was subjected to extensive examination by the plaintiff's coun-
sel. Nonetheless, the court found in accordance with the Loper requirement
that no one could dispute that the contracts were erroneously written.88
In three Texas cases the courts considered the admissibility of hospital
records. Two medical reports were in issue in Gonzales v. Gilliam.3 9 The
first contained a final diagnosis that the plaintiff had suffered a "cervical
disc." The report was made some eight months after an operation had been
performed to correct the condition. Apparently the doctor did not elaborate
on the basis of his diagnosis in the report and accordingly the defendant com-
plained that the report was not "couched in terms of a reasonable degree of
medical probability. ' 40 The court rejected the defendant's argument and
held that the report was properly admitted. An additional concern of the
court in Loper was that an opposing party might be prejudiced because of
his inability to cross-examine an expert who had entered a diagnosis in a busi-
ness record. As a means of mitigating this prejudice and to insure the relia-
bility of the diagnosis the court required that the record contain demonstrable
medical facts sustaining the diagnosis. 41 The court in Gonzales held that this
requirement was met by a detailed report by the doctor who performed the
operation. Thus, the absence from the diagnostic record of corroborating
facts was not fatal if the trial record elsewhere contained the necessary reci-
tation of the supporting facts.
The second report considered in the Gonzales case contained a doctor's
discussion of the possibility that the plaintiff had suffered a nerve complica-
tion. The questioned section of the record included a discussion of symptoms
which tended to disprove the existence of the nerve complication coupled
with the doctor's opinion that he would "hate to make -this diagnosis." The
court, relying on the supreme court's opinion in Otis Elevator Co. v. Wood,42
held that since the questioned section of the report did not tend to prove any-
thing harmful to the defendant, its admission was not error.
Likewise, Texas Steel Co. v. Recer43 concerned the admissibility of doctors'
reports. One report contained statements that the plaintiff was injured nine
days before the doctor had examined him, and that he was in pain at the
time of the examination. The accident had occurred in the presence of at
least two other persons and the doctor's report was not offered to prove any
facts relating to that event. Thus, this case was not like the "lone worker"
cases in which statements in the doctor's report are offered to show how the
plaintiff suffered the injury.44 The court of civil appeals properly perceived
this distinction and held that thete was no reason to exclude the report. An-
37. Id. at 305.
38. 499 S.W.2d at 367.
39. 506 S.W.2d 650 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1974, no writ).
40. Id. at 651.
41. 404 S.W.2d at 305.
42. 436 S.W.2d 324 (Tex. 1968).
43. 508 S.W.2d 889 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
44. See, e.g., Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Hale, 400 S.W.2d 310 (Tex. 1966).
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other report contained a statement that the plaintiff had been in pain since
the time of the accident. The court found that such statements of past physi-
cal conditions which were related to a consulting physician were hearsay and
were erroneously admitted into evidence. However, the court refused to
reverse the trial court on this point because the admission of this report con-
stituted harmless error. 45 Under the new Federal Rules of Evidence 46 it is
likely that statements made by a patient to a consulting physician would be
admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule. The federal rules take the
broader viewpoint that statements made by the patient to assist the doctor
either in diagnosis or treatment should be admissible, although hearsay,
because the physical well-being of the out-of-court declarant depends on the
truthfulness of these statements and upon this premise is based the assurance
of reliability necessary for the exception of statements from the hearsay
rule.4 7
The Fifth Circuit in Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories48 continued to forge a
liberal policy regarding documents which do not fit nicely into conventional
exceptions to the hearsay rule. Judge Wisdom eschewed reliance on either
the Texas Business Records Act or the federal statute49 in sustaining the ad-
mission of a listing of polio cases in Hidalgo County, Texas, during 1,970 in
a products liability action against a manufacturer of an oral polio vaccine.
The plaintiff apparently could not find a sponsoring witness for the document
and therefore relied on cross-examination to establish that the County Health
Department regularly kept such records, that one of the defendants' witnesses
from the Health Department was present at the time the report was made,
and that some of the handwriting on the document was that of the director
of the 'Public Health Unit for the county. Notations on the report linked
the defendants to the vaccine from which the plaintiff contracted polio.
Using the rationale of Dallas County v. Commercial Union Assurance
Co.,50 the court reaffirmed that a federal trial judge is free to admit any evi-
dence under Federal 'Rule of Civil Procedure 43(a) so long as the judge is
satisfied that the evidence is necessary for a full presentation of the case and
that there is sufficient indication of the trustworthiness of the evidence. 51 In
Reyes the necessity for the questioned document was readily apparent. Re-
garding the trustworthiness of the report, the court said that it may be
presumed that the experts in the Department of Health had a high degree
of motivation to be conscientious in analyzing and recording the incidence
of polio in the county. Additionally, the witness from the Department of
Health -testified that she was present when the report was being drafted.
Given these indications of the general reliability of the document, the nota-
0
45. See Tx. R. Civ. P. 434. For an interpretation of the harmless error concept
with regard to the erroneous admission of evidence see Purvis v. Johnson, 430 S.W.2d
226, 231 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1968, no writ).
46. FED. R. Evm. 803(4).
47. See generally McCoRMICK § 293, at 692.
48. 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974).
49. 28 U.S.C. § 1732(a) (1970).
50. 286 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1961).
51. 498 F.2d at 1287.
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tions linking the defendants to the vaccine given the plaintiff were also
entitled to the conclusion that they were sufficiently trustworthy to permit
the evidence to go to the jury.
In Seeley v. Eaton 5 2 the court of civil appeals applied, somewhat reluc-
tantly, the rule set out by the Texas Supreme Court in an earlier decision
concerning the use in evidence of medical texts. "When a doctor testifies
as an expert relative to injuries or diseases he may be asked to identify a
given work as a standard authority on the subject involved; and if he so recog-
nizes it, excerpts therefrom may be read not as original evidence but solely
to discredit his testimony or to test its weight."53 Dr. Eaton, a defendant in
a medical malpractice case, was asked on cross-examination if he recognized
certain texts as standard authority. He refused to recognize any texts as
authorities, although he did admit that he used some of them to obtain his
medical knowledge. The trial court refused to allow excerpts to be read for
any purpose, and the court of civil appeals affirmed on the basis of Bowles
v. Vourdon.54
Several reasons have been advanced as a justification for the rule applied
in Eaton. Medical knowledge may develop rapidly, so the textual material
may be out of date; the technical language employed in texts may be con-
fusing to the trier of fact; the possibility of quoting out of context raises the
specter of an unfair use; there is a difficulty in determining what texts are
those which could be considered as established authority; the expertise is
really a matter of skill rather than academic knowledge, and other experts
will therefore likely be better sources of evidence; the author of the text was
not under oath and is not subject to cross-examination. 55
Wigmore takes the position that only the lack of cross-examination poses
any real reason for excluding the evidence for substantive purposes, and that
the need of the evidence and the general assurance of reliability is such that
it should be admitted. Only two states provide for a broad exception to the
hearsay rule for scientific texts.5 6 However, the Federal Rules of Evidence
provide for an exception for "published treatises, periodicals, or pamphlets
on a subject of history, medicine, or other science or art" established as "reli-
able authority" by the testimony or admission of the witness or by "other
expert testimony or by judicial notice."'5 7
The court in Eaton recognized that under the present rule, it was "hardly
surprising . . . that Dr. Eaton would refuse to recognize as an authority a
text that could be used to impeach his testimony."58 It suggested, however,
that it might have been permissible for the trial court to have allowed the
cross-examination since the expert admitted that he had used the texts in his
52. 506 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
53. Bowles v. Bourdon, 148 Tex. 1, 6, 219 S.W.2d 779, 783 (1943) (emphasis
added).
54. 148 Tex. 1, 219 S.W.2d 779 (1943).
55. Id. See generally 6 J. WIGMORE, supra note 15, § 1690.
56. City of Dothan v. Hardy, 237 Ala. 603, 188 So. 264 (1939); Lewandowski v.
Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co., 33 Wis. 2d 69, 146 N.W.2d 505 (1966).
57. FED. R. EvID. 803(18).
58. 506 S.W.2d at 723.
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studies. As the court stated, "the exclusion of properly qualified medical
texts solely upon the opinion of the testifying physician as to their lack of
authoritative value seems to be somewhat harsh." 59 -In McMillen Feeds, Inc.
v. Harlow"0 the admission into evidence of an issue of a magazine to prove
the truth of facts stated in the magazine was approved. Similar action with
respect to an established medical text seems only reasonable.
59. Id.
60. 405 S.W.2d 123 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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